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Section A. Case Study 
It is August 2013, in two weeks time the Board meets to decide on whether to go forward 
with the acquisition of Oriental Brewery (OB). Alan Johnson
1
 is the Head of Corporate 
Development at AB InBev, the World’s largest brewer, and is in charge of presenting the 
case to the Board. 
Oriental Brewery was AB InBev’s South Korean unit, sold in 2009 to KKR and Affinity 
Equity Partners in a transaction with an embedded Call Option that gave the company the 
right to reacquire the asset between July 2014 and July 2015 at a pre-agreed multiple of 
11.0x EBITDA. The Board has mentioned concerns regarding the early exercise 
(acquisition of the asset ahead of the exercise period) of the Call Option as it sees value in 
keeping it until maturity, so as to see how market conditions evolve. Given that AB InBev 
is still financially stretched due to the $20bn acquisition of Grupo Modelo in 2012, Alan 
needs to consider leverage issues that may arise as well as asset pricing concerns.  
AB InBev background  
AB InBev has a long history of acquisitions. The company was founded in 2004 under the 
name InBev, following the merger of Belgium’s Interbrew and Brazil’s Ambev 
(Companhia de Bebidas das Américas). This merger between Europe’s and South 
America’s largest brewers created, at the time, the number one global brewer with around 
12% share in the global beer market.  
The merger was expected to generate synergies of €280m (c.$350m) over the coming years, 
through a combination of technical, procurement and other general and administrative cost 
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savings, as well as commercial (revenue) synergies such as the cross-licensing of existing 
brands. The new entity’s flagship global brands included Interbrew’s Stella Artois and 
Beck’s, as well as Ambev’s Brahma.  
In July 2008, the company went through yet another significant undertaking by acquiring 
industry giant Anheuser-Bush (AB). This $52bn acquisition was the largest ever in the 
industry to date and created an undisputed No 1 global brewer with a global beer market 
share of around 20%. The newly formed AB InBev now owned brands such as Budweiser, 
Bud Light and Corona from Anheuser-Busch, as well as InBev’s Stella Artois, Beck’s and 
Brahma brands.  
The acquisition had a very strong rationale and significant synergistic potential. There 
would be minimal geographic overlap between the two companies, as well as possibility for 
cross-selling brands in different markets, leading to higher revenues. For example, 
Budweiser, No 1 brand in the United States, could now enjoy an established global 
distribution channel. In addition, InBev has long had a strong reputation for financial 
control and sets the industry standard in cost minimization and supply chain optimization
2
. 
By applying these standards, there was potential to improve AB’s margins via cost 
reduction, as well as combined R&D. The World’s No 1 had further strengthened its 
purchasing power through the ability to better negotiate long term pricing agreements with 
suppliers. The merger was expected to realize $1.5bn in synergies over the next 3 years – 
$1.0bn from AB and $0.5bn from InBev.  
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The transaction was financed with both debt and equity, including $45bn in bank debt
3
 as 
well a $9.8bn rights issue, implying that over 80% of the deal was debt financed. One of the 
company’s major concerns with the deal was its commitment to maintaining an investment 
grade profile, based on credit rating agencies’ metrics. To do so, it committed to a rapid de-
leveraging of its Balance Sheet to a target 2.0x leverage
4
 through strong cash flow 
generation, enhanced focus on working capital improvements, a more flexible dividend 
policy throughout the first two to three years following the acquisition
5
 and a series of asset 
disposals. According to a company announcement: 
“Financing of the transaction has been structured for rapid repayment of a 
significant portion of the credit facilities through anticipated asset disposals 
and capital markets issuances” 
Post-merger asset disposals 
At the end of 2008, AB InBev’s leverage reached 4.7x
6
, higher than any other brewer. The 
following year, the company set itself to executing $7bn in assets divestitures. In doing this, 
it tried to ensure divestments had minimal operational impact by setting up agreements with 
the buyer, in addition to favouring divesting to Private Equity firms over competitors. Over 
the course of the year, AB InBev completed $9.4bn in divestitures. 
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These included, for example, its Labatt business in the US, sold to KPS Capital Partners. 
One of its key divestitures to a competitor involved the sale of its 27% stake in Tsingtao, 
China’s second largest brewer, to a consortium including Asahi, who paid $667m for a 
19.9% stake and private investor Chen Fashu, who paid $235m for a 7% stake. 
Among its major disposals at the time was the sale of Oriental Brewery, its South Korean 
unit, to KKR. The deal was announced in May 2009 and completed two months later. In 
addition to AB InBev’s stake in Tsingtao, this represented one of the company’s main 
gateways into Asia, the World’s fastest growing beer market at the time. Therefore, it was 
not in the company’s long-term interest to dispose of such a strategic asset. However, due 
to the need to de-lever and repay some of its debt, the company was forced to go through 
with the sale of OB. The transaction was completed for an equity value of $1.8bn and 
included several covenants, such as an embedded Call Option and an Earn-Out agreement. 
KKR’s post crisis situation 
Founded in 1976, KKR is a multinational Private Equity firm, based in the US. The firm is 
one of the largest and most renowned PE firms in the World, having established itself in the 
1980’s leveraged buyout hype, which it pioneered.  
In 2007, the worst global financial crisis since the 1930’s took place, the so called subprime 
crisis. It originated from the US housing bubble and soon affected US financial institutions 
(e.g. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, Bank of America acquired Meryl Lynch) and 
quickly spread to the rest of the World, sending developed economies into recession. In 
Europe, it triggered the debt crisis forcing overleveraged countries such as Greece, Ireland 
or Portugal to ask for bailouts from international organisations.  
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The economic meltdown took a very hard toll on Private Equity firms who saw their 
invested companies experience financial distress and an inability to invest the cash they had 
raised in their funds during the boom years due to a lack of 1) solid assets to invest in; 2) 
available credit. During the pre-crisis period LBO firms raised as much as $507bn in cash 
from investors and were at this point struggling to find good investments and secure debt 
financing in order to meet their funds’ return hurdles.  
In 2008, KKR recorded the largest loss in its history, with a net loss of $1.2bn. One year 
before, the firm had raised its first Asia fund, a $4bn regional fund, and was now struggling 
to find good investments to deploy its investors’ cash and achieve appropriate returns.  
The 2009 asset disposal 
On May 7
th
 2009, AB InBev and KKR announced they had entered an agreement to sell AB 
InBev’s South Korean unit Oriental Brewery for a total consideration of $1.8bn. This was, 
at the time, the largest leveraged buyout since the start of the year.  
The transaction resulted from a fairly quick arrangement given how keen both parties were 
to complete the transaction. It implied an estimated EV/EBITDA LTM multiple of 8.8x
7
. 
Table 1 shows the sources of funds used in the transaction that include $750m in equity 
and $1,050m in debt
8
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Table 1. Sources and Uses of Funds in OB acquisition by KKR 
The deal managed to get debt financing in the height of the global financial and economic 
crisis, when credit was considered to be frozen. However it came at a cost: a debt stake of 
about 58% of total consideration, compared to 75% in the leveraged buyout’s boom years. 
As KKR’s Asia head Joseph Bae said upon announcement, the firm’s “large” equity 
commitment and the “high asset quality” helped secure debt financing. “The Oriental deal 
doesn’t necessarily mean the market is reopening for buyouts, but it shows that with the 
right asset, the right buyer, a fairly priced deal and some creativity on structuring, there’s 
debt available”.  
Despite the large equity stake in the investment, vendor financing and the quality of the 
asset with No 2 position in its domestic beer market, bank loans were syndicated to spread 
default risk. In addition, KKR contracted loans in both USD and KRW to minimize 
currency exposure, given market uncertainty.  
Besides the vendor financing provided by AB InBev, the deal had some specific covenants. 
The first of these was a Call-Option that gave AB InBev the right to buy back Oriental 
Brewery for a pre-agreed multiple of 11.0x EV/EBITDA LTM between July 2014 and July 
2015. Only after this period expired, and in case AB InBev had not exercised its option by 
then, was KKR allowed to market its asset to other potential acquirers.  
Sources ($m) Uses ($m)
Equity 750          Equity consideration 1,800       
Debt 1,050       
Vendor financing 300          
Bank loans 750          
Total 1,800       Total 1,800       
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The second option embedded in the deal was an Earn-Out agreement between the two 
parties in which KKR committed to share part of the returns it was to make from the sale of 
the asset with AB InBev. These returns were measured using two metrics: Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) and Money Multiple (MM). In the event that KKR was to have a return 
higher than a pre-determined hurdle in these metrics, it was contractually obliged to “share” 
this excess return with the vendor, AB InBev
10
. This is often called an “anti-
embarrassment” clause for the vendor, in a sense that it prevents the acquirer from buying 
the asset at a low price to then sell it for a large profit. 
These agreements between the two parties – i.e. vendor financing, call option, earn-out – 
were valuable to both. AB InBev would be able to re-acquire its South Korean unit with a 
strategic role in its long-term expansion into Asia, with no competition. In addition, the 
earn-out agreement allowed it to “save face” in case the acquirer was able to generate very 
high returns from this deal – besides profiting from said returns. In what regards KKR, it 
would be able to secure financing to complete the deal, which without the provided vendor 
financing would have been complicated – if not impossible. Furthermore, it benefited from 
a contractual double-digit exit multiple agreement, which was considered a reasonable 
price, bearing in mind market conditions at the time. 
On July 7
th
 2009, shortly after the deal was announced, KKR sold 50% of its equity stake to 
Affinity Equity Partners, for $400m
11
. Affinity Equity Partners is a Hong-Kong based 
Private Equity firm investing in Asian companies. By doing so, KKR would be co-
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managing its investment in Oriental Brewery. The goal behind this sale was twofold: on the 
one hand, KKR immediately profited from its investment and returned some cash to its 
investors. On the other hand, KKR welcomed Affinity into the partnership as it was keen to 
enjoy the latter’s expertise in the field both due to its experience and to the proximity that 
its Seoul office offered OB’s management team.  
Oriental Brewery and the South Korean beer market 
Oriental Brewery is one of South Korea’s largest brewers. Founded in 1952 by the 
industrial conglomerate Doosan, it was acquired in 1998 by the Belgium brewer Interbrew 
to be then integrated in 2004 into InBev, after the merger between Interbrew and Ambev.  
The company, currently operated by KKR and Affinity, owns the country’s most popular 
beer – Cass. In addition to it, its portfolio includes Cass Light, Cass Fresh, Cafri and 
Budweiser as well as Golden Lager. These brands are produced, imported and marketed in 
South Korea based on an agreement between the company (and its owners) and AB InBev 
that grants it exclusive rights in the country. Along with Hite, Oriental Brewery’s main 
competitor, they control about 95% of the South Korean beer market, in volume terms. In 
Figure 1 the evolution of this duopoly’s market share is shown and OB’s dominance over 





Figure 1. Top players in South Korea beer market 
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Under KKR and Affinity’s tutelage, Oriental Brewery has seen its market share grow from 
c.40% to over 50%. This dominance was driven not only by a strong strategy from the 
management team, but also by a lacklustre performance on Hite’s end.  
Oriental Brewery has benefited from a distracted competitor. Hite has been suffering from 
integration problems post the acquisition of Jinro, the World’s largest Soju
12
 producer 
(even though the acquisition was completed in 2005, only in 2011 did the Fair Trade 
Commission allow for integration of its marketing and sales strategies). The lack of cultural 
integration has led to a decrease in synergies from the merger. Given the strength of its 
Workers Union, it has had trouble letting go of employees (which is one of the most 
common – though extreme – forms of cost cutting), thus limiting the potential to improve 
margins.  
As OB managed to focus efforts on its Cass brand – with variations such as Cass Light and 
Cass Red that appeal to the younger generation, comprising almost half of the country’s 
beer consumption – to drive consumer preference, Hite’s flagship brands have been losing 
traction with the Korean consumer.  
Beer market growth in South Korea is expected to be driven not only by volumes but 
mostly through pricing. Volume growth over the next years will be modest with an 
annualized growth over the next 5 years
13
 of 2.7%, as depicted in Figure 2. Revenue 
growth is expected to be largely driven by pricing, which can boost market revenue growth 
to reach 4-5.5% annually over the next 5 years. This is pushed by a premiumisation of the 
beer market, as consumers become ever more aware of the different brands and start 
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favouring those that offer a more premium flavour – such as OB’s Premier OB and AB 





Figure 2. South Korea beer volumes (million L) 
This consolidated market is also under pressure from potential entrants, such as Lotte. Lotte 
is a Japanese/South Korean conglomerate with strong presence in non-alcoholic beverages 
and liquor that has long wished to enter the beer business in this market. In fact, it was one 
of the frontrunners for the acquisition of Oriental Brewery, when, in 2009, it was surpassed 
by KKR and Affinity. Although Lotte has historically focused on beer imports (e.g. brands 
such as Asahi and L) it has been vocal regarding its interest to expand in South Korea.  
AB InBev recent developments 
On June 29
th
 2012 AB InBev announced yet another transformational acquisition: Grupo 
Modelo. The company has acquired the 50% stake it did not already own of the Mexican 
brewer for $20.1bn in cash. This gave the World’s largest brewer full control over the 
Corona brand – US’s largest imported beer by volume – and a leadership position in 
Mexico, the World’s No 3 largest beer profit pool, behind the US and Brazil.  
The acquisition of the remainder of Grupo Modelo represented a major push towards 
building presence in the faster growth emerging markets. In addition, its global distribution 
channels will provide meaningful opportunities to push the Corona brand outside the US 
and Mexico markets, along with potential cost savings of c.$600m annually. 
 1,822  
 1,961  
 2,155  
 2,312  
2009A 2012A 2015E 2018E 
// // // 
 
11 
The acquisition price represents an EV/EBITDA LTM multiple of 12.9x, above a historical 
average of 12.3x for similar deals since 2005. This comes to show the greater appetite for 
brewing stocks and their higher valuations since the financial crisis. Completed two months 
ago, in June 2013, synergies arising from the acquisition are expected to amount to $1bn 
annually, which corresponds to 15.6% of the target company’s sales
14
. AB InBev is known 
to be able to cut cots and improve working capital requirements of the targets it acquires, 
thus benefiting not only from improved margins but also increased cash flow generation. 
Working capital benefits from the acquisition are expected to reach $500m annually.  
After this acquisition, AB InBev has began to look again at other potential targets and 
continued to focus on its growth strategy. In April 2012, AB InBev’s subsidiary Ambev 
gained control of Cerveza Nacional Dominicana through a strategic alliance with E. León 
Jimenes S.A. by contributing Ambev Dominicana along with a cash payment of $1.0bn, 
representing an EV/EBITDA LTM multiple of c.13.0x.  
The acquisition of Grupo Modelo resulted in yet another increase in leverage, which had 
been coming down since the 2008 acquisition of Anheuser-Busch, as shown in Figure 3. 
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AB InBev’s financial control and ability to reduce leverage is something very well received 
by credit rating agencies. In fact, after the announcement of the acquisition of Modelo 
Moody’s upgraded the company’s outlook to positive, since it trusts in AB InBev’s cash 
flow generation ability and the opportunity that this acquisition represents, despite a 
temporary increase in leverage
15
.  
At the moment AB InBev has nearly $7bn in cash and short-term investments and around 
$4.5bn of its $8bn credit facilities still available. This comes to show the amount of 
liquidity the company has available to fund its activities and potential investments. 
Global beer market 
Since the financial crisis, global brewers – AB InBev included – have been shifting their 
focus towards high growth emerging markets rather than developed economies. Grupo 
Modelo was a major step AB InBev took towards increasing its exposure to emerging 
economies. These markets, namely in Asia, South America and Africa, are expected to 
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Figure 4. Beer market volume CAGR 2013-18E by major region 
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Besides focusing their efforts on organic growth in emerging markets, M&A activity 
around targets in these regions has been increasing. Valuations of these targets have been 
climbing since the global financial meltdown and the EV/EBITDA LTM multiple of 
selected key transactions since 2011 averages 13.5x
16
. In addition, it is interesting to see 
how emerging market beer companies are being traded at higher multiples when compared 
to global brewers
17
. As of the end of July 2013, these averaged 13.1x EV/EBITDA 2013, 
compared to 10.3x of global brewers.  
These factors come to prove the optimism in the beer market and especially around a 
potential market consolidation, in which global brewers look for ways to improve growth 
that has been lagging in developed markets.  
KKR and Affinity today 
The current economic scenario for Private Equity firms, such as KKR and Affinity Equity 
Partners, is very different from what it was 4 years ago, upon the acquisition of Oriental 
Brewery. Debt availability into these types of riskier investments has regained its strength, 
particularly in the US.  
KKR completed raising its second Asia fund at the start of July. Fund raising for this $6bn 
fund has been supported by a strong track record from KKR’s first Asia fund, which was 
fully subscribed and includes investments such as Intelligence, a Japanese recruitment 
group, sold for a fivefold return as well as Oriental Brewery, expected to create at least 4x 
initial invested capital returns.  
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By contrast, Affinity Equity Partners has been under some pressure from investors. It is 
currently in the process of raising its fourth APAC fund, Affinity Asia Pacific Fund IV but, 
as opposed to KKR who has been supported by a stellar track record in its previous fund, 
Affinity’s APAC fund III, a $2.8bn fund in which Oriental Brewery is included, has had a 
mixed track record. OB is its largest and best performing asset, though investments outside 
South Korea have been underperforming. Therefore, its fund raising efforts have so far 
yielded a quantum of $1.5bn at first close, from a target of $3.8bn. It is thus looking to 
cristalyse well performing investments and return cash to its investors, in an attempt to 
boost confidence and secure funding for its fourth fund.  
Dynamics of a potential early exercise of the Call Option 
Alan has been thinking of whether it would make sense for AB InBev to exercise its option 
early, before the pre-established period from July 2014 to July 2015. He knows that the 
company looks at potential investments in two ways – strategically and financially. The 
first focuses on the fit between AB InBev and the target, bearing in mind economic 
conditions, the company’s M&A “fire-power”, the potential synergy creation and the fit of 
the target in its short and long-term strategy. As for financial considerations, the company 
analyses how much value can be extracted from the target and looks at three major 
financial metrics: ROIC, NPV and Accretion/Dilution analysis – the latter dictates in part 
market reaction. Finally it also needs to consider leverage implications arising from the 
acquisition and how this may affect reaching its target. 
Assuming the acquisition of OB does make sense for AB InBev at the moment, Alan needs 
to think of what could trigger KKR and Affinity into being willing to sell their asset ahead 
of the Option’s exercise period, in order to present a structured plan to the Board in a few 
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weeks time. Strategically, the firms would be able to cash in immediately and return some 
of this cash to investors. In addition, by selling the asset immediately they reduce the risk 
of potential competition from a dormant competitor – Hite – and potential entry – Lotte. On 
the other hand, given that the price of the sale to AB InBev is based on a fixed 
EV/EBITDA LTM multiple and EBITDA is expected to keep rising, the longer they hold 
the asset, the greater the cash amount they will get for Oriental Brewery – although this 
does not necessarily imply a higher IRR. 
There were certainly a lot of different perspectives to consider in such a deal, in particular 
because by exercising the option early “everything becomes negotiable”. 
Conclusion 
Alan Johnson has gone over a very broad list of targets in Emerging Markets. However, he 
keeps reaching the conclusion that Oriental Brewery would be the logical acquisition. And 
so the question remains: should AB InBev exercise its Option early and acquire OB now? 
When presenting to the Board in two weeks, Alan will need to focus on two different 
issues: Why AB InBev should go forward with the acquisition at the moment, instead of 
waiting for the exercise period as there is value in optionality; and how AB InBev could 
present the case to the Private Equity firms to compel them to accept this early exercise. It 
is thus necessary to understand the strategic and financial rationale for all parties involved 
in order to present a potential structured deal. Seems like a lot of work for only two weeks.
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Section B. Discussion Topics 
Case Study key takeaways 
1. Leverage Importance of leverage in companies and its main drawbacks 
2. Private Equity How Private Equity firms look at value creation and investment analysis 
3. M&A Asset disposals and valuation issues 
4. Derivatives Importance of the use of options and other financial instruments in 
Corporate Finance and how these create value in transactions 
 
Potential discussion questions 
Corporate financial decision-making 
 What are the consequences of over leverage in a company? How has it affected 
AB InBev’s strategic decisions over the past 5 years? 
 What are the main concerns of the Board at the moment and how can they be 
mitigated? 
2009 asset disposal 
 Why did KKR allow for a Call Option and Earn-Out agreement to be embedded in 
the original deal? Why did AB InBev concede a vendor loan? 
The current deal 
 Why would the Private Equity firms be willing to sell early? 
 Why would AB InBev want to buy back its asset early (or at all)? 
 How much should AB InBev be willing to pay for the asset? Please focus on 
 How much is Oriental Brewery worth to AB InBev?  
 Would this be an accretive acquisition? 
 Calculate the returns for the Private Equity firms – both IRR and MM  
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Section C. Discussion Note 
AB InBev’s asset disposal, in 2009, marked an important milestone in its history. It was 
part of its de-leveraging program, after the 2008 merger with Anheuser-Busch. This 
transaction came in the midst of the global financial crisis, which created difficulties in 
finding a buyer, as well as in securing a reasonable value for the asset. 
The deal was negotiated quickly, given time constraints on both sides: AB InBev was 
“desperate” to dispose of the asset and get cash to pay down its debt burden, while KKR 
and Affinity were “sitting on piles of cash” from investors with no solid investment to 
make. Therefore, both parties agreed to terms that they might otherwise prefer not to 
include in such deal. These included the $300m vendor financing provided by AB InBev, as 
well as the Call-Option an Earn-Out agreement that put a cap on the Private Equity firms’ 
returns, if it were to be exercised. However, these terms were necessary for the deal to go 
forward at the time and ended up shaping the situation that both parties are currently in. 
AB InBev rationale 
AB InBev, as any corporate, analyses investment opportunities under two different 
perspectives: strategically and financially. The first aims to assess whether it makes 
strategic sense to go forward with an investment whereas the latter analyses several 
financial metrics that help quantify how beneficial such investment is. These metrics 
include, but are not limited to, ROIC and NPV. 
 Oriental Brewery is a solid asset that has been performing very well in the past years under 
KKR and Affinity ownership and there is very little doubt in the market that AB InBev will 
indeed want to reacquire the asset. Besides being No 1 in its domestic market and 
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exhibiting a continuously growing market share, AB InBev may leverage off of its strategic 
positioning in order to penetrate the broader Asian market. 
The real question lies on why AB InBev would be interested in exercising the option early. 
Firstly, it would gain control of the asset sooner, allowing it to exploit both cost and 
revenue synergies. In addition, AB InBev will be able to pay a lower quantum for it. Since 
its acquisition price is pegged to its EBITDA LTM, and this metric is expected to keep 
increasing, the longer it waits the higher the acquisition price.  
On the other hand, the Board’s concerns do make sense and there is indeed value in 
optionality. There is less exposure to FX risk and increased competition (from the 
“awakening” of a dormant Hite or the entrance of Lotte). These risks would make AB 
InBev better off by waiting to then make a more informed decision after these concerns 
have played out in the market. Furthermore, by going through with the acquisition, AB 
InBev will in fact be actively choosing to delay reaching its leverage target of 2.0x, which 
may send a negative message to the markets. However, it is important to bear in mind that 
credit rating agencies seem to assimilate positively AB InBev’s strategic acquisitions given 
the company’s financial control ability and strong cash flow generation. In the end the 
decision cannot rely solely on the strategic rationale but also on its financial sense. 
KKR and Affinity rationale 
In order to build a compelling argument to the Board it is necessary to understand why the 
firms would be interested in going forward with an early exercise of the option.  
In general terms, both firms benefit from cashing in immediately and distributing returns to 
its investors. They become less exposed to the volatility and uncertainty in the South 
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Korean beer market, as well as the potential entry of new competitors or the renewed focus 
of Hite – the latter’s internal problems have been one of success factors of Oriental 
Brewery’s brands in its domestic market and the extraordinary gain in market share. On the 
other hand, the longer KKR and Affinity wait, the larger the quantum amount they will get 
for OB, given the call-option agreement, which could give them an incentive to delay the 
transaction. However, this does not imply a higher IRR, as will be shown later on. 
In the end, it all comes down to the timing of the transaction. KKR has just successfully 
raised a second Asia fund, however, Affinity, currently raising another APAC fund, is 
having more difficulties in luring investors. It is in need of crystallising returns in order to 
show good results after a historically patchy track record. Since the firms have been 50/50 
partners throughout OB ownership, their internal politics will come into play in what comes 
to the final decision. 
How KKR and Affinity look at returns 
When assessing how much to pay for an asset we need to think of how much the seller 
stands to make in order to be able to make a reasonable offer and move forward with 
negotiations. By running an LBO model we are able to estimate their potential returns. 
Calculations are based on Oriental Brewery’s historical financial statements in Appendix 
II and assume that all the available generated cash flow is used to repay debt
18
.  
By assuming an exit in December 2013 at 11.0x LTM EBITDA, the Private Equity firms 
are expected to make around 48.5% IRR and an impressive 5.9x MM. These values are pre-
earn-out agreement, thus will be brought down once KKR and Affinity make the cash 
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 Cash available to repay debt is affected by a minimum operating cash level of 2% of sales as well as 
theoretically assumed 20% of total generated cash being trapped and thus not readily available for debt 
repayment, since it is an emerging economy 
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payment to AB InBev. Table 2 and Table 3 show the range of possible returns for the 
Private Equity firms, based on the exit date and the exit multiple. 
 
  Table 2. Internal Rate of Return    Table 3. Money Multiple 
  Exit year    Exit year 
  2012 2013 2014 2015    2012 2013 2014 2015 
Exit  
Multiple 
10.0x 47.7% 44.8% 40.7% 39.1%  
Exit 
Multiple 
10.0x 3.9x 5.3x 6.5x 8.5x 
10.5x 50.3% 46.7% 42.1% 40.2%  10.5x 4.2x 5.6x 6.9x 9.0x 
11.0x 52.8% 48.5% 43.4% 41.3%  11.0x 4.4x 5.9x 7.3x 9.4x 
11.8x 56.6% 51.1% 45.5% 42.9%  11.8x 4.8x 6.4x 7.9x 10.2x 
12.3x 58.9% 52.7% 46.7% 43.8%  12.3x 5.1x 6.7x 8.2x 10.6x 
 
The Earn-Out agreement embedded in the deal stipulated that 15% of the maximum excess 
value between IRR and MM
19
 would be paid out to AB InBev, as exemplified in Table 4. 
This opens room to further negotiation between the involved parties given that, even if the 
two were to agree on the 11.0x EBITDA LTM price, it is necessary to consider whether this 
refers to a pre or post Earn-Out payment to AB InBev, as in Table 5.  
  Table 4. Earn-Out value ($m)    Table 5. Exit multiple post Earn-Out 
  Exit year    Exit year 
  2012 2013 2014 2015    2012 2013 2014 2015 
Exit  
Multiple 
10.0x 103 258 399 624  
Exit 
Multiple 
10.0x 9.7x 9.4x 9.3x 9.1x 
10.5x 131 293 440 675  10.5x 10.1x 9.9x 9.7x 9.5x 
11.0x 159 328 481 725  11.0x 10.6x 10.3x 10.1x 9.9x 
11.8x 204 384 546 806  11.8x 11.3x 11.0x 10.8x 10.6x 
12.3x 232 419 587 857  12.3x 11.7x 11.4x 11.2x 11.0x 
 
How much is OB worth to AB InBev 
Oriental Brewery has been a unit of AB InBev in the past, which gives the company an 
informational advantage when compared to an external buyer. This may prove very helpful 
in accessing the synergistic potential of the target and the transaction, allowing for a more 
accurate prediction of synergies and value creation potential. 
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 Refers to 15% of the excess value above the hurdles of 35% IRR and 3.0x MM. Of these, the maximum 
quantum between the two is paid out to AB InBev 
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Synergistic value is expected to be created from both cost and revenue. Cost synergies, are 
expected to originate from procurement cost reductions, centralization of management and 
improved efficiency in distribution channels. Even though margins are already high – 2012 
EBITDA margin of 33.4% – there is room for improvement. Besides cost reduction, 
Working Capital requirements are deemed to have the potential for enhancement. AB 
InBev, as the World’s largest brewer has an improved negotiating capacity with both 
suppliers and clients that a local brewer like OB does not, thus leading to more beneficial 
NWC requirements. Finally, revenue is expected to increase by pushing other global brands 
into the South Korean market, such as Corona. Leverage concerns can also be mitigated 
since the impact of this acquisition adds only 0.3x leverage to the company
20
. 
In order to assess the true value of Oriental Brewery, several methods have been used. 
Valuation was run off OB’s Operating model
21
, in Appendix V. By conducting an Analysis 
at Various Prices (AVP), where we compare OB’s value computed through a DCF
22
, 
trading and transaction multiples
23
, as in Appendix VI, Oriental Brewery’s value to AB 
InBev lies between $6.0-6.5bn. This represents an LTM multiple of 12.9-13.9x, above the 
11.0x agreed in the call-option agreement. Such negotiation, where “everything is on the 
table”, will benefit from a wide window of opportunity for AB InBev. This will focus not 
only on the 11.0x pre-agreed in the Call option, but also taking into account the Earn-Out 
discount factor.  
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 Based on PF 2013E EBITDA, a funding gap of $5.1bn fully debt financed, given an acquisition price of 
11.8x EV/EBITDA LTM 
21
 Topline growth driven by the expected increase in beer volumes in South Korea, appreciation of OB’s 
market share and improvement in pricing and product mix; run-rate pre-tax synergies amounts to 8% of OB’s 
2013E sales, reaching $118m, phased in over 3 years 
22
 DCF assumes a WACC of 8% and a TGR of 3% 
23
 Trading comparable companies include brewers depicted in Appendix IV (range of 11.2-12.2x LTM and 




The Call Option embedded in the transaction cannot be accurately priced using quantitative 
methods as it is expected that EBITDA keeps growing. As the acquisition price is pegged 
to a multiple of this metric, the longer we wait to exercise, the higher the cash amount we 
will have to pay for the asset. Thus, every day we are maximizing the option value, as 
tomorrow to cost of acquiring OB will be higher. However, the Option does bear value. 
Upon the 2009 agreement, it granted a “safe” acquisition multiple in an industry that AB 
InBev expected to improve considerably. As an example, by comparing the option’s 11.0x 
multiple to the industry’s recent emerging market average of 13.5x, we see that, for an 
exercise in Dec-2014, the difference in value amounts to about $1.4bn
24
. 
AB InBev financial analysis 
The acquisition is EPS accretive from year 1 and has a 7.9% ROIC in year 1 rising up to 
over 11% in year 4, as depicted in Table 6, proving that it does make financial sense. 
 




 it is 
possible to argue the viability of an acquisition now rather than waiting.  Even though year 
1 ROIC is higher for an acquisition in Dec-2014, from year 2 onwards we are better off by 
acquiring OB in Dec-2013.   
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 EV difference between a price of 11.0x and 13.5x based on EBITDA LTM of $546m; Ignores Earn-Out  
25
 Assumes a year end acquisition, 100% debt financed at an interest rate of 5% 
26
 Assumes a pre-earn-out acquisition multiple of 11.8x  
27
 Assumes a pre-earn-out acquisition multiple of 11.0x EBITDA LTM as per the Call-Option agreement 
 Table 6. EPS accretion/dilution and ROIC analysis25 
 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
EPS accretion/(dilution) 2.0% 2.8% 3.1% 3.1% 
ROIC @ Dec-2013 7.9% 9.9% 10.7% 11.1% 









Appendix II – Oriental Brewery historical financial statements 
Income statement
30
         
     
($m) 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 
Revenue  639.6   790.6   968.9   1,118.1  
COGS  (271.7)  (348.4)  (420.7)  (471.2) 
Gross profit  367.9   442.2   548.2   647.0  
     
SG&A  (214.1)  (247.2)  (291.5)  (320.4) 
Other income  4.4   13.9   7.2   5.2  
Other expenses  (25.1)  (128.0)  (20.2)  (8.1) 
Operating profit  133.2   81.0   243.7   323.6  
     
Interest income  10.0   9.3   9.2   8.8  
Interest expense  (4.0)  (106.8)  (73.4)  (54.8) 
Profit before taxes  139.2   (16.6)  179.6   277.6  
     
Income tax expense  (39.8)  16.5   (59.6)  (73.3) 
Net income 
 
 99.4   (0.1)  120.0   204.4  
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 The term ‘Beia’ stands for ‘Before exceptional items and amortization’ 
29
 Estimates based on broker consensus as of Aug-2013 
30
 All items translated from KRW to USD at the average exchange rate for the respective year 
($m) 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013E 2014E 2015E 
Revenue  36,758   36,297   39,046   39,758   44,092   45,988   47,873  
EBITDA  13,036   13,869   15,357   15,511   17,152   18,625   19,484  
D&A  2,789   2,704   2,750   2,746   2,866   2,989   3,112  
EBIT  10,247   11,165   12,607   12,765   14,286   15,636   16,373  
Non-recurring items  1,321   (268)  (278)  (32)  -     -     -    
Net interest expense  (4,419)  (3,736)  (3,137)  (2,366)  (2,034)  (1,558)  (1,234) 
Income from associates  513   521   623   624   692   722   751  
Profit Before Taxes  7,662   7,682   9,815   10,991   12,944   14,800   15,889  
Income tax expense  (1,786)  (1,920)  (1,856)  (1,680)  (1,978)  (2,262)  (2,429) 
Net income  5,876   5,762   7,959   9,311   10,965   12,537   13,461  
        
Minority interests  (1,264)  (1,736)  (2,104)  (2,165)  (2,550)  (2,915)  (3,130) 
Exceptionals  (686)  1,014   594   41   -     -     -    
Net income to 
shareholders beia28 
 3,926   5,040   6,449   7,187   8,415   9,622   10,331  
        
Basic EPS beia  2.48   3.17   4.04   4.49   5.26   6.01   6.46  
Diluted EPS beia  2.46   3.13   4.00   4.41   5.17   5.91   6.35  
        
Other headline items               
        
Net debt  45,403   40,383   34,845   37,290  38,321  38,323   39,517  
Capital expenditures  1,386   2,123   3,256   3,089   3,551   3,638   3,822  
Working capital  -     (7,357)  (8,328)  (10,409)  (11,694)  (11,881)  (12,039) 
Source: Company Reports, Analyst Research, Author Analysis 





         
     
($m) 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 
ASSETS 
    
     
Current assets 
    
Cash and cash equivalents  108.4   152.5   151.4   158.0  
Current held-to-maturity financial assets  0.2   0.2   0.0   0.1  
Trade and other receivables  177.5   195.7   220.8   228.6  
Inventories  44.8   48.0   60.3   70.3  
Other current assets  2.7   2.6   2.3   2.4  
Total current assets  333.4   399.1   434.8   459.4  
     Non-current assets 
    
Held-to-maturity financial assets  2.1   0.1   0.2   0.1  
Long-term deposits  17.5   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Long-term trade and other receivables  30.1   55.2   46.3   42.8  
PPE  571.6   583.2   618.2   615.0  
Investment property  1.0   15.6   10.8   5.2  
Intangible assets  1,074.1   1,273.8   1,330.5   1,308.3  
Other non-current assets  8.5   1.7   1.3   1.0  
Total non-current assets  1,704.9   1,929.5   2,007.2   1,972.3  
     
Total assets  2,038.3   2,328.7   2,442.0   2,431.7  
     
EQUITY & LIABILITIES 
    
     Current liabilities 
    
Short-term borrowings  30.2   56.7   29.3   90.3  
Derivative liabilities  1.2   0.1   1.9   2.4  
Trade payables  20.7   50.2   83.4   72.6  
Other payables  58.7   48.9   67.0   70.7  
Accrued expenses  2.0   18.6   20.0   15.0  
Guarantee deposits received  18.3   19.3   21.4   21.1  
Current portion of long-term borrowings  25.9   -     -     28.5  
Other current liabilities  138.4   124.3   256.9   212.1  
Total current liabilities  295.2   318.1   480.0   512.9  
     Non-current liabilities 
    
Long-term borrowings  952.3   1,104.5   893.2   663.6  
Provision for sales return  -     0.8   0.5   0.5  
Long-term payables  14.0   0.0   -     -    
Derivative liabilities  10.0   -     -     -    
Defined benefit liabilities  9.7   14.9   21.7   28.1  
Deferred income tax liabilities  50.3   86.8   94.5   88.3  
Total non-current liabilities  1,036.3   1,207.0   1,009.9   780.4  
     
Total Liabilities  1,331.5   1,525.1   1,489.9   1,293.3  
     
Equity 
    
Common shares  73.3   81.2   84.8   83.4  
Capital surplus  659.9   729.5   761.2   748.7  
Capital adjustments  (0.7)  -     -     -    
Retained earnings  (25.6)  (7.2)  106.1   306.4  
Total Equity  706.8   803.6   952.1   1,138.4  
     
Total Equity & Liabilities  2,038.3   2,328.7   2,442.0   2,431.7  
 
    
  
                                                          
31
 All items translated from KRW to USD at the year-end exchange rate for the respective year 





         
     ($m) 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 
     
Cash flows from operating activities 
    
Profit (loss) for the period  99.4   (0.1)  120.0   204.4  
     
Adjustments for: 
    
Depreciation & amortization  54.9   63.9   55.8   46.7  
Retirement benefits  5.4   8.7   9.7   9.8  
Income tax expense (benefit)  -     (16.5)  59.6   73.3  
Gain of foreign currency translation  -     (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.1) 
Gain on sale of PPE  (0.7)  (5.0)  (1.4)  (0.7) 
Other losses  3.6   85.4   17.6   6.8  
Interest expense  28.8   106.8   73.4   54.8  
Interest income  -     (9.3)  (9.2)  (8.8) 
     
Change in assets and liabilities: 
    
Net trade receivables/(payables)  (4.6)  35.7   20.2   (18.5) 
Net other receivables/(payables)  (20.6)  (5.8)  14.3   6.9  
Net advance payments/(receipts)  -     (0.2)  0.7   (0.1) 
Prepaid expenses  (1.0)  1.3   (0.2)  (0.3) 
Derivative assets  -     (9.8)  (0.1)  (0.7) 
Inventories  7.8   (1.5)  (10.2)  (11.0) 
Other current assets  1.7   2.0   0.1   0.2  
Long-term trade receivables  -     4.7   9.6   5.6  
Guarantee deposits received  (1.2)  (1.0)  1.9   0.1  
Accrued expenses  0.5   1.5   1.8   (0.2) 
Withholdings  25.7   (31.4)  83.6   (47.1) 
Other current liabilities  10.0   0.0   0.9   (0.9) 
Provision for loss on sales return  -     0.3   (0.3)  (0.0) 
Payment of retirement benefits  (9.0)  (5.8)  (12.1)  (6.1) 
Cash generated from operating activities  200.7   223.9   435.4   313.8  
     
Interest received  -     1.9   1.9   2.4  
Interest paid  -     (77.7)  (68.8)  (57.5) 
Income taxes payable  (2.0)  (32.3)  (11.0)  (69.7) 
Net cash from operating activities  198.7   115.7   357.6   189.1  
     
Cash flows from investing activities 
    
Net proceeds from sale/(acquisition) of financial assets  -     0.0   0.0   (0.0) 
Net decrease/(increase) in loans to employees  0.6   0.6   1.3   0.8  
Net decrease/(increase) in key money deposits  (0.6)  (0.6)  3.6   (1.2) 
Net proceeds from sale/(acquisition) of PPE  (17.2)  (21.4)  (59.3)  (47.3) 
Net proceeds from sale/(acquisition) of intangible assets  (0.0)  (1.7)  (1.8)  (1.6) 
Acquisition of consolidated entities  (1,710.1)  -     -     -    
Other,net  (0.2)  (0.0)  0.0   0.0  
Net cash used in investing activities  (1,727.5)  (23.1)  (56.1)  (49.4) 
     
Cash flows from financing activities 
    
Net increase/(repayment) in short-term borrowings  (17.1)  19.3   (29.9)  61.5  
Net increase/(repayment) in long-term borrowings  971.7   (82.2)  (279.2)  (192.2) 
Proceeds from issuance of common stock  -     3.6   -     -    
Other, net  94.9   (0.4)  0.0   (0.0) 
Net cash used in financing activities  1,049.6   (59.7)  (309.2)  (130.7) 
     
Effect of exchange rate fluctuations on cash held  -     0.0   (0.1)  0.1  
     Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of period  706.9   227.6   260.6   252.8  
Change in cash and cash equivalents  (479.2)  32.9   (7.7)  9.1  
Cash and cash equivalents at end of period  227.6   260.6   252.8  261.9 
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 All items translated from KRW to USD at the average exchange rate for the respective year 
Source: Company Reports 
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Appendix III – Selected precedent transactions 
Date Target Acquirer EV/EBITDA LTM 
Synergies 
% target sales 
Jul-13 Hartwall Royal Unibrew 8.8x na 
Jul-12 APB Heineken 17.1x 1.7% 
Jun-12 Grupo Modelo AB InBev 12.9x 15.6% 
Apr-12 Starbev MolsonCoors 11.0x 5.0% 
Apr-12 Cerveza Nacional Dominicana Ambev 13.0x na 
Aug-11 Foster's SABMiller 13.4x na 
Jan-10 FEMSA Heineken 9.6x 5.9% 
Jun-08 Anheuser-Busch InBev 12.4x 13.5% 
Jun-08 SABMiller MolsonCoors JV 7.1% 
Oct-07 S&N Carlsberg 13.9x 6.2% 
Oct-07 S&N Heineken 12.9x 4.9% 
Jul-04 Coors Molson 10.4x 9.4% 
Mar-04 Ambev Interbrew 11.7x 6.7% 
     
Average   12.3x 7.6% 
Median   12.7x 6.5% 
 
 
Appendix IV – Peer trading valuation multiples  
2013 2014 2013 2014 2013 2014
AB InBev 202,374      154,469     96.1       5.1x 4.1x 13.0x 10.5x 15.9x 12.6x
Global brewers
SABMiller 95,912        78,272       48.8       4.1x 3.7x 17.0x 13.4x 19.8x 15.6x
Heineken 57,950        40,384       70.1       2.4x 2.1x 11.1x 9.2x 15.1x 13.1x
Carlsberg 21,894        15,223       98.9       1.8x 1.7x 9.0x 8.1x 12.7x 11.2x
Kirin 24,087        14,236       14.8       1.0x 1.0x 7.0x 7.3x 13.6x 14.4x
Asahi 15,265        12,287       25.4       0.8x 0.9x 7.7x 7.9x 12.2x 12.1x
MCBC 13,009        8,037         50.1       3.3x 2.9x 10.2x 9.0x 13.2x 11.9x
Emerging markets brewers
AmBev 118,101      118,000     7.5         7.5x 6.9x 15.5x 14.1x 17.4x 15.9x
Thaibev 13,884        10,644       0.4         2.6x 2.4x 15.9x 14.0x 18.6x 16.7x
Efes 10,247        8,139         13.7       2.9x 1.9x 14.3x 10.1x 23.6x 15.5x
CCU 4,859          4,286         13.3       2.2x 2.0x 9.9x 9.2x 13.0x 12.0x
Beijing Yanjing 2,629          2,730         1.0         1.3x 1.0x 10.1x 7.0x 23.0x 11.7x
Global soft drinks
Coca Cola 198,323      177,681     40.1       4.1x 4.0x 15.0x 13.7x 17.6x 16.3x
PepsiCo 152,257      128,837     83.5       2.3x 2.2x 12.3x 11.0x 15.7x 13.9x
DPS 12,082        9,515         46.7       2.0x 1.9x 9.2x 8.9x 11.2x 10.6x
Global spirits
Diageo 92,931        78,175       31.1       5.4x 5.0x 14.4x 14.6x 15.9x 16.2x
Pernod Ricard 43,125        31,530       118.8     3.8x 3.6x 13.0x 12.6x 14.0x 13.6x
Brown Forman 16,399        15,613       72.5       4.3x 3.8x 17.3x 14.7x 18.3x 15.5x










Source: Company Reports, Press Releases 
Source: Factset Research Systems ad of July 31, 2013 (assessed on October20, 2014) 
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Appendix V – Oriental Brewery Operating model  
 
(YE Dec, $m) 2012A 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 
Sales 
           
1,118  
         
1,285  
         
1,473  
         
1,682  
         
1,761  
         
1,838  
         
1,915  
% growth 15.4% 15.0% 14.6% 14.2% 4.7% 4.4% 4.2% 
COGS            (471)          (521)          (596)          (681)          (741)          (774)          (806) 
% margin 42% 41% 41% 41% 42% 42% 42% 
Gross profit             647             765             876          1,001          1,019          1,064          1,109  
% margin 57.9% 59.5% 59.5% 59.5% 57.9% 57.9% 57.9% 
        
SG&A            (274)          (298)          (342)          (390)          (408)          (426)          (444) 
% margin 24.5% 23.2% 23.2% 23.2% 23.2% 23.2% 23.2% 
Net synergies                  -                   -                12               65            118            118             118  
% margin 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 3.9% 6.7% 6.4% 6.2% 
EBITDA              373             467             546             675             729             756             782  
% margin 33.4% 36.3% 37.1% 40.2% 41.4% 41.1% 40.9% 
        
D&A                47               54               62               70               74               77               80  
% margin 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 
EBIT              327             413             485             605             655             679             702  
% margin 29.2% 32.1% 32.9% 36.0% 37.2% 36.9% 36.7% 
        
Capex             (50)  (57)            (66)            (75)            (79)            (82)            (86) 
% margin 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
        
∆ NWC              (37)            (41)            (46)            (52)            (20)            (19)            (19) 
% margin (3.3)% (3.2)% (3.2)% (3.1)% (1.1)% (1.0)% (1.0)% 
 
 















EV 4.0 5.0 
 
6.0 7.0 8.0 
EV/EBITDA LTM 8.6x    10.7x 
 
12.9x 15.0x 17.1x 
EV/EBITDA NTM 7.4x 9.3x 
 
11.2x 13.0x 14.9x 
Net debt 0.7 0.7 
 
0.7 0.7 0.7 
Equity value 3.3 4.3 
 
5.3 6.3 7.3 
 5.2  
 5.2  
 5.5  
 6.2  
 5.7  
 5.7  
 6.0  
 6.7  
Source: Company Reports, Author Analysis 
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